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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________________ 
 
                                              

Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware, sitting by 
designation. 
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STARK, District Judge. 
 This case arises from the well-known Ponzi scheme 
operated by Bernard L. Madoff.  Plaintiffs-Appellants Stanley 
Baer, Jesse L. Cohen, Alan Roth, Elaine Ruth Schaffer, and 
Lenore H. Schupak (“Appellants”) were customers of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”).  
On March 7, 2011, Appellants brought suit against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1346(b), 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”), to recover damages for 
injuries resulting from the failure of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to uncover and terminate 
Madoff‟s Ponzi scheme in a timely manner.  The District 
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the complaint 
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that 
Appellants‟ claims were barred by the discretionary function 
exception (“DFE”) to the FTCA.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  
The District Court also denied Appellants‟ requests for 
jurisdictional discovery and to amend the complaint.  We will 
affirm. 
I 
 As this is an appeal from the District Court‟s grant of a 
motion to dismiss, we, like the District Court, accept the well-
pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
construe them in the light most favorable to Appellants.  See 
Lora-Pena v. FBI, 529 F.3d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam).  The allegations contained in Appellants‟ complaint 
are derived substantially from a 457-page report prepared by 
the SEC‟s Office of Investigations (the “OIG Report”), which 
describes in detail the SEC‟s failed multi-year investigation 
of Madoff‟s Ponzi scheme: 
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The OIG investigation found that 
the SEC received numerous 
substantive complaints since 1992 
that raised significant red flags 
concerning Madoff‟s hedge fund 
operations and should have led to 
questions about whether Madoff 
was actually engaged in trading 
and should have led to a thorough 
examination and/or investigation 
of the possibility that Madoff was 
operating a Ponzi scheme.  
However, the OIG found that 
although the SEC conducted five 
examinations and investigations 
of Madoff based upon these 
substantive complaints, they never 
took the necessary and basic steps 
to determine if Madoff was 
misrepresenting his trading.  [The 
OIG] also found that had these 
efforts been made with 
appropriate follow-up, the SEC 
could have uncovered the Ponzi 
scheme well before Madoff 
confessed. 
(OIG Report at 456).
1
 
                                              
1More thorough descriptions of Madoff‟s operations and the 
SEC‟s investigations of them are set forth in numerous recent 
decisions of other courts and need not be repeated here.  See, 
5 
 Appellants contend that had the SEC investigated 
BLMIS with even the most basic level of competence, 
Madoff‟s scheme would have been discovered and 
Appellants‟ losses would have been prevented.  Their 
complaint alleges three causes of action under the FTCA: (1) 
that the SEC was negligent in its investigations of BLMIS; 
(2) that the SEC aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty 
committed by BLMIS; and (3) that the SEC aided and abetted 
the fraud perpetrated by BLMIS.
2
  The government moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the alleged 
misconduct fell within the discretionary function exception to 
the FTCA.  The District Court agreed with the government 
and dismissed the complaint.  The District Court also denied 
Appellants‟ motions seeking jurisdictional discovery and 
leave to amend the complaint.  Appellants timely appealed. 
II 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We “exercise plenary review over application of the 
                                                                                                     
e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. 122, 
126-32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Dichter-Mad Family 
Partners, LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020-
24 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff‟d, 709 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam). 
2
Although Appellants contend that the District Court erred by 
not differentiating among their three causes of action, 
Appellants do not explain why these causes of action, which 
are based on the same set of operative facts, should be 
analyzed separately.  Indeed, Appellants‟ opening and reply 
briefs do not distinguish among the three causes of action. 
6 
FTCA‟s discretionary function exception.”  Merando v. 
United States, 517 F.3d 160, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2008).  
“Questions of subject matter jurisdiction raised on a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) are also reviewed de novo.”  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att‟y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 530 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 Appellants “bear[] the burden of demonstrating that 
[their] claims fall within the scope of the FTCA‟s waiver of 
government immunity,” while the government “has the 
burden of proving the applicability of the discretionary 
function exception.”  Merando, 517 F.3d at 164 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As we explain, the District Court 
correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
III 
 The FTCA waives the federal government‟s sovereign 
immunity with respect to tort claims for money damages.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  The discretionary function exception 
limits that waiver, eliminating jurisdiction for claims based 
upon the exercise of a discretionary function on the part of an 
employee of the government.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).  
Specifically, pursuant to the DFE, the government retains 
sovereign immunity with respect to “[a]ny claim . . . based 
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a 
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or 
not the discretion involved be abused.”  Id.  In this way, the 
discretionary function exception draws a “boundary between 
Congress‟ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United 
States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities 
from exposure to suit by private individuals.”  United States 
v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984).  Congress 
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enacted the DFE to “prevent judicial „second-guessing‟ of 
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy through the medium of an 
action in tort.”  Id. at 814. 
 To determine whether the DFE applies, courts employ 
a two-part test.  First, a court must “consider whether the 
action is a matter of choice for the acting employee.  This 
inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct 
cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of 
judgment or choice.”  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 
531, 536 (1988).  Second, a court must determine whether the 
judgment exercised “is of the kind that the discretionary 
function exception was designed to shield.”  Id.  This is 
because the DFE “protects only governmental actions and 
decisions based on considerations of public policy.”  Id. at 
537.  Notably, “if a regulation allows the employee 
discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a 
strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the 
regulation involves consideration of the same policies which 
led to the promulgation of the regulations.”  United States v. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991). 
IV 
 Appellants contend that the SEC is not protected from 
liability under the DFE because neither part of the two-part 
test is satisfied here.  In particular, Appellants argue that the 
SEC conduct challenged by their complaint violated 
numerous mandatory, non-discretionary statutes and 
regulations.  Appellants further assert that any discretion 
exercised by the SEC is not susceptible to policy analysis. 
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 In most respects, Appellants‟ arguments repeat those 
uniformly rejected by other courts that have considered suits 
against the SEC brought by victims of the Madoff Ponzi 
scheme.  After briefly describing how we reach the same 
conclusions as these other courts on the overlapping issues, 
we focus on the two bases on which Appellants seek to 
distinguish their complaint. 
A 
 Appellants contend that the SEC violated several 
mandatory internal procedures during the BLMIS 
investigation by: (1) failing to obtain trading verifications; (2) 
failing to commence investigations promptly; (3) failing to 
draft closing reports; and (4) failing to log investigations into 
the SEC‟s examination tracking system.  Appellants have not 
demonstrated, however, that the procedures on which they 
rely are anything more than discretionary guidelines for SEC 
personnel. 
 For example, although Appellants argue that “[t]rading 
verifications must be obtained from third parties,” such as the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (App. Br. at 30) 
(emphasis added), they cite no source for such a mandatory 
duty.  To the contrary, the OIG Report – which forms the 
basis for Appellants‟ complaint – states that “verifying 
trading activity from an independent source was not an 
‘essential’ part of a Ponzi scheme investigation.”  (OIG 
Report at 325) (emphasis added).  Likewise, Appellants 
contend in their briefing that “[i]nvestigations must be 
commenced promptly and MUIs [(Matters Under Inquiry)] 
must be opened at the beginning of the investigation” (App. 
Br. at 30) (emphasis added), but they ground this assertion in 
no regulation, and even their complaint only alleges that 
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“MUI‟s should be opened promptly,” that is within “days, 
hours, [or] weeks” (A49 ¶ 61, A64 ¶ 129) (emphasis added).  
Appellants‟ contention that SEC employees “must draft 
closing reports at the end of investigations” (App. Br. at 30) 
(emphasis added) is belied by the portion of the OIG Report 
on which they rely, which states, instead, that preparing “a 
closing report at the conclusion of an examination is „good 
practice‟” (OIG Report at 136).  Similarly, although 
Appellants allege that “[i]nvestigations must be logged into 
the SEC‟s STARS tracking system” (App. Br. at 30) 
(emphasis added), they base this assertion on 15 U.S.C. § 
78q(k),
3
 which provides that the “Commission and the 
examining authorities . . . shall eliminate any unnecessary and 
burdensome duplication” and “shall share such information . . 
. as appropriate to foster a coordinated approach” (emphasis 
added).  As the emphasized statutory language illustrates, an 
element of discretion is involved in determining what 
investigative material is to be logged into the STARS tracking 
system.  (See also OIG Report at 133) (“Again, there was no 
rule or policy about it, but I think the information-sharing at 
that level between offices was not always great.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 Hence, we agree with the District Court, as well as the 
other federal courts that have considered these issues, and 
conclude that Appellants have failed to identify any violation 
of a mandatory policy or guideline by any SEC employee.  
See Donahue v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103-14 
(D.D.C. 2012); Molchatsky v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 
421, 431-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff‟d, 713 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 
                                              
3
In 2010, section 78q(k) was re-designated as section 78q(j). 
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2013); Dichter-Mad, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-51, aff‟d, 709 
F.3d 749. 
B 
 Appellants‟ principal argument for an outcome 
different from that in all of the similar lawsuits to date is that 
Appellants, unlike other victims, allege the SEC had no 
discretion to favor Madoff, “a Wall Street bigwig,” and for 
this reason the SEC‟s conduct is not protected by the DFE.  
Appellants cite to four SEC regulations as the bases for a 
mandatory duty that the SEC not accord preferential 
treatment to anyone, including someone of Madoff‟s former 
stature.  See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8); 17 C.F.R. § 200.64; 
17 C.F.R. § 200.61; 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-2(a).  For example, 
5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8) provides: “Employees shall act 
impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private 
organization or individual.” 
 The problem for Appellants is that the regulations on 
which they rely are inherently intertwined with the SEC‟s 
discretionary authority to determine the timing, manner, and 
scope of SEC investigations.  See, e.g., Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp. 
v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The 
extent and scope of an investigation remains a matter of the 
agency‟s discretion.”); Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 
944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[The] discretionary function 
exception protects agency decisions concerning the scope and 
manner in which it conducts an investigation so long as the 
agency does not violate a mandatory directive.”).  As set out 
in statute, the SEC: 
may, in its discretion, make such 
investigations as it deems 
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necessary to determine whether 
any person has violated, is 
violating, or is about to violate 
any provision of this chapter   . . . 
.  The Commission is authorized 
in its discretion . . . to investigate 
any facts, conditions, practices, or 
matters which it may deem 
necessary or proper to aid in the 
enforcement of such provisions. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (emphasis added).  SEC regulations 
likewise reflect that the SEC‟s investigative authority is 
discretionary: 
The Commission may, in its 
discretion, make such formal 
investigations and authorize the 
use of process as it deems 
necessary to determine whether 
any person has violated, is 
violating, or is about to violate 
any provision of the federal 
securities laws or the rules of a 
self-regulatory organization of 
which the person is a member or 
participant. 
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (emphasis added). 
 That Appellants are, in essence, challenging 
discretionary decisions relating to the timing, manner, and 
scope of SEC investigations is evident from Appellants‟ 
specific allegations as to how the SEC violated its purportedly 
12 
mandatory duty of non-preferential treatment.  Appellants 
allege that the SEC discouraged junior examiners from 
questioning Madoff‟s responses to SEC inquiries, failed to 
scrutinize evidence provided by Madoff, delayed the Madoff 
investigation, and reassigned examiners who raised concerns 
with respect to the investigation.  All of these actions involve 
government actors‟ exercise of judgment and choice of the 
kind the discretionary function was designed to shield.  See 
generally Varig, 467 U.S. at 809-10 (“[The DFE is] designed 
to preclude application of the [FTCA] to a claim based upon 
an alleged abuse of discretionary authority by a regulatory or 
licensing agency – for example, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Foreign Funds Control Office of the Treasury, or others.  It is 
neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of 
legislation, the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a 
discretionary administrative act should be tested through the 
medium of a damage suit for tort.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 77-
2245, at 10) (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
United States v. Pooler, 787 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“[W]hen the sole complaint is addressed, as here, to the 
quality of the investigation as judged by its outcome, the 
discretionary function [exception] should, and we hold, does 
apply.  Congress did not intend to provide for judicial review 
of the quality of investigative efforts.”), abrogated on other 
grounds by Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441 (Mar. 
27, 2013).
4
 
                                              
4Appellants‟ reliance on cases such as Fair v. United States, 
234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), is unhelpful, as these involve 
plaintiffs challenging government actions that created 
reliance interests for specific individuals, as opposed to “only 
13 
 The regulations identified by Appellants also do not 
prescribe any particular course of action for the SEC to 
follow.  See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.  At most, these 
regulations attempt to limit the scope of discretion afforded 
the SEC during the course of an investigation.  While a 
violation of these regulations may amount to an abuse of 
discretion, that is not sufficient to waive the federal 
government‟s sovereign immunity, as the discretionary 
function exception applies “whether or not the discretion 
involved be abused.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 Additionally, because SEC regulations afford 
examiners discretion regarding the timing, manner, and scope 
of investigations, there is a strong presumption that the SEC‟s 
conduct is susceptible to policy analysis.  See Gaubert, 499 
U.S. at 324.  Appellants‟ attempt to rebut this presumption by 
alleging an SEC intent to protect a “Wall Street bigwig” is 
unavailing.  “The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s 
subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred by 
statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken 
and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”  Id. at 
325 (emphasis added).  Whether to pursue a lead, to request a 
document, or to assign additional examiners to an 
investigation are all discretionary decisions, which 
necessarily involve considerations of, among other things, 
resource allocation and opportunity costs.  See generally Bd. 
of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Courts 
cannot intelligently supervise the Commission‟s allocation of 
its staff‟s time, because although judges see clearly the claim 
                                                                                                     
an activity designed to be protective of the interest of that 
amorphous group known as the public as a whole,” id. at 293, 
as is the case here. 
14 
the Commission has declined to redress, they do not see at all 
the tasks the staff may accomplish with the time released.”).  
The discretionary function exception immunizes the 
government from a lawsuit based on such discretionary 
judgments.
5
 
 Moreover, were we to agree that a preferential 
treatment allegation is sufficient to overcome application of 
the discretionary function exception, we would effectively 
eliminate the discretionary function exception for SEC 
investigations.  Any investigative decision by the SEC could 
potentially be challenged by someone as the product of 
favoritism or discrimination.  A plaintiff should not be 
permitted to overcome application of the DFE through 
creative pleading.  See Fisher Bros. Sales v. United States, 46 
F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also Molchatsky, 
713 F.3d at 162 (“The DFE is not about fairness, it „is about 
power‟; the sovereign „reserve[s] to itself the right to act 
without liability for misjudgment and carelessness in the 
formulation of policy.‟”) (quoting Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. v. 
United States, 115 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
C 
 Appellants‟ other basis for distinguishing this case is 
the allegation that the SEC does not have discretion to 
commit misprision of felony.  According to Appellants, if the 
SEC had conducted a proper investigation, it would have 
discovered Madoff‟s fraudulent scheme and, once discovered, 
it would have acquired a mandatory duty to disclose the fraud 
                                              
5Appellants‟ characterization of the SEC‟s failings as being 
due to “laziness” does nothing to alter our analysis. 
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to the public, regardless of whether the SEC made a 
discretionary decision to pursue an enforcement proceeding. 
 Appellants rely on 18 U.S.C. § 4, the federal 
misprision of felony statute, which provides: 
Whoever, having knowledge of 
the actual commission of a felony 
cognizable by a court of the 
United States, conceals and does 
not as soon as possible make 
known the same to some judge or 
other person in civil or military 
authority under the United States, 
shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than three 
years, or both. 
The elements of misprision of felony are: “(1) the principal 
committed and completed the felony alleged; (2) the 
defendant had full knowledge of that fact; (3) the defendant 
failed to notify authorities; and (4) the defendant took steps to 
conceal the crime.”  United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 
544 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 There is no dispute that Madoff committed a felony.  
However, none of the remaining elements of misprision of 
felony is present here.  Most importantly, the SEC did not 
have “full knowledge” of Madoff‟s fraud.  Indeed, the 
complaint alleges that “the SEC failed to take the most basic 
investigatory steps that would have uncovered and put an 
immediate end to Madoff‟s fraud.”  (A35 ¶ 6(a)) (emphasis 
added).  Accepting this allegation as true, the SEC necessarily 
lacked full knowledge of Madoff‟s criminal conduct.  
16 
Lacking such knowledge, the SEC also could not have failed 
to notify authorities nor taken steps to conceal Madoff‟s 
crime.  For at least these reasons, Appellants‟ contentions 
regarding misprision of felony do not create subject matter 
jurisdiction for their claims. 
V 
 Appellants also challenge the District Court‟s 
discretionary decisions to deny them jurisdictional discovery 
and leave to file an amended complaint. 
A 
 We review a district court‟s denial of jurisdictional 
discovery for abuse of discretion.  See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 2003).  Here, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Appellants‟ request to conduct discovery regarding the 
existence of additional SEC internal procedures.  Appellants 
had and relied on the SEC‟s detailed 457-page OIG Report, 
which includes a discussion of numerous SEC procedures and 
policies.  The SEC subsequently issued a follow-up report 
that examines the Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations‟ “modules, policies, procedures and guidance 
associated with the conduct of its examinations.”  SEC OIG 
Rpt. No. 468, Review and Analysis of OCIE Examinations of 
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, at 2 (Sept. 
29, 2009).  The SEC‟s Enforcement Manual is available 
online.  Despite these materials, Appellants have been unable 
to identify any regulation, policy, or procedure that would 
overcome application of the discretionary function exception.  
Appellants cannot establish a “reasonable expectation that 
17 
discovery will reveal evidence of” any such policy.  See Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
B 
 Appellants contend that the District Court improperly 
denied their request to amend the complaint to include 
allegations that: (1) the SEC knowingly destroyed records 
from the Madoff investigations in violation of federal law; 
and (2) certain SEC employees involved in the Madoff 
investigations were subject to internal discipline.  We review 
a district court‟s denial of a motion to amend a pleading for 
abuse of discretion.  See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 
F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  Again, we find no abuse of 
discretion. 
 Appellants‟ allegation of improper document 
destruction is not relevant to the claims at issue.  Indeed, 
Appellants‟ proposed amended complaint does not add any 
separate cause of action based on the improper destruction of 
documents.  The addition of allegations that documents were 
improperly destroyed would not take Appellants‟ claims 
outside the application of the discretionary function 
exception.  Likewise, the allegation that disciplinary 
proceedings have been brought against certain SEC 
examiners does not help Appellants establish that any SEC 
employee violated a mandatory policy, and, thus, does not 
allow Appellants to overcome application of the DFE. 
VI 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
